When Can a Law Firm Discriminate Among Its Own Employees to Meet a Client\u27s Request? Reflections on the ACC\u27s Call to Action by Putnam, Clare Tower
Comments
WHEN CAN A LAW FIRM DISCRIMINATE AMONG
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Clare Tower Putnam*
Robert Black and William White are senior associates at Makeus
Lotsuf Munnie, LLP, a large law firm in Metropolis. They both went to
good colleges and the same top-tier law school. The firm has several
hundred lawyers and has had success over the years in hiring, retaining and
promoting female and minority attorneys. Both Bob and Will have done
well at the firm, but Will's area of expertise-intellectual property-has
been particularly busy in recent years, whereas Bob's field-mergers and
acquisitions-has been a little slow. As a result, most people at the firm
think Will has a better chance at making partner than Bob.
Earlier this year, however, the firm received a Request for Proposal
from a Fortune 100 company. The Request is in Will's field, intellectual
property, but the firm has decided to put Bob on the team it will "pitch" to
the client. Indeed, if the firm gets the business, it plans to designate Bob as
the "relationship attorney"--a designation that will guarantee Bob
partnership along with a considerable increase in income related to the fees
associated with this new account.
Upon hearing this news, Will is distraught. There are only so many
opportunities for partnership in any given year, and if Bob gets this one-
particularly in intellectual property-it seems certain that Will will not
become a partner any time soon, if at all. Accordingly, Will goes to see the
firm's Managing Partner, Simon Munnie. Munnie is sympathetic, but
explains that the firm is a business and it needs to keep its clients happy. It
is true that Will has more experience in the field, but the client wants to
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deal with an African-American. The firm's intellectual property group is
relatively small and the only African-American partner in the field is in no
position to take on additional work. Unless the firm proposes an African-
American as the relationship attorney, Munnie says, there is a good chance
the client will go elsewhere. Bob is African-American. He is also a
perfectly good lawyer who can learn whatever he needs to learn to service
this account. Will might have been a better choice "on the merits," but
Will is white. So the firm is going with Bob. "It's nothing personal,"
Munnie says, "business is business."
Needless to say, Will is being discriminated against because of his
race. The question explored in this comment is whether that discrimination
is legal. A significant number of very sophisticated lawyers seem to think
that it is, even though the law seems clear that a business cannot favor one
employee over another on the basis of race simply because it has good
reason to believe that its customers demand that it do so. For decades, this
kind of discrimination has been analyzed by applying the law relating to
"bona-fide occupational qualifications." As discussed below, that law does
not appear to provide a defense for Mr. Munnie here. Moreover, even the
law of affirmative action-which is most likely the law upon which Mr.
Munnie's clients could rely-has not yet been applied in such a manner
that it could provide an obvious defense for the firm.
I. DOES MAKEUS LOTSUF MUNNIE LLP EVEN EXIST?
It is true, of course, that there is no listing for Makeus Lotsuf Munnie
LLP in the Vault Guide to the Top 100 Law Firms. If the firm is
imaginary, however, the hypothetical presented above is finrly based in
reality. In recent years, a number of major companies have begun to
emphasize their commitment to "diversity," not only in their own
workplaces but elsewhere. In particular, they have made it clear that they
expect their service providers-including their lawyers-to share this
commitment and to promote diversity in their firms.
Clients are making their preferences known, not only privately but
publicly as well. In 1999, the Chief Legal Officers (CLOs) of about 500
major companies in the United States signed Diversity in the Workplace, a
Statement of Principle.' This statement sought to increase diversity in the
workplace of the companies themselves and of the businesses with which
they worked. That statement of principles, however, did not produce the
effect its authors hoped it would and, five years later, some of them
concluded that something stronger was needed. In 2004, Rick Palmore, the
1. Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession, http://www.clocalltoaction.com/
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
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Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary of Sara Lee and
a member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Corporate
Counsel (ACC)2, produced a diversity "Call to Action."3  The Call to
Action states:
[W]e pledge that we will make decisions regarding which law
firms represent our companies based in significant part on the
diversity performance of the firms. We intend to look for
opportunities for firms we regularly use which positively
distinguish themselves in this area. We further intend to end or
limit our relationships with firms whose performance consistently
evidences a lack of meaningful interest in being diverse.4
In contrast to a mere statement of principles, Palmore's "Call to Action"
contemplated real consequences for firms that failed to produce results. At
Palmore's urging, the ACC endorsed the Call to Action at its October 24,
2004 meeting.5
Not surprisingly-given the public position so many of these
companies have taken-the demand for "diverse" lawyers (and the threat
not to deal with firms who fail to produce "diverse" lawyers) has begun to
show up in the "Requests for Proposals" ("RFPs") that the law departments
of these companies send to law firms when they are looking to hire a firm
for a particular engagement or type of work. For example, a recent request
from Schering-Plough includes this:
The promotion of a diverse work environment is one of S-P's
core values, and in this regard, the S-P Law Department has a
specific goal of supporting diversity in the legal profession.
Schering-Plough requires the law firms that represent Schering-
Plough to actively promote diversity in their workplace. The
Law Department also requires [that] a diverse mix of individuals
and firms work on its legal matters.6
A similar "Request for Interest" from Pfizer reads:
We will expect our partnering counsel to work actively to
2. Association of Corporate Counsel: Virtual Library Resource Summary,
http://acc.com/resource/v5748 (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
3. Call to Action Home Page, supra note 1; see also Call to Action: Diversity in the
Legal Profession Corporate Signatories, http://www.mcca.com/CTA/signatories.shtml (last
visited Feb. 19, 2007).
4. Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession Commitment Statement,
http://www.mcca.com/CTA/commitment.shtml (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
5. Association of Corporate Counsel, supra note 2. See also Call to Action Corporate
Signatories, supra note 3 (listing signatories, including the General Counsels or CLOs of
such companies as Verizon, Wal-Mart, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Starbucks, JC Penney,
Merck, General Motors and General Mills).
6. Schering-Plough Law Department Request for Proposal, at 3 (Oct. 7, 2005) (on file
with author).
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promote diversity within their workplace. To that end, if
selected, we will urge you to make a diligent effort in the
recruitment, retention and promotion of women and minority
lawyers. We will also ask that you afford them opportunities to
work on Pfizer matters.7
General Electric makes its law firms report back on their diversity progress
by filing reports twice a year. The Company's "Outside Counsel Policy"
states:
General Electric expects the law firms that represent GE to work
actively to promote diversity within their workplace. In
accordance with this commitment, GE requests on a bi-annual
basis diversity-related information from its outside counsel.
Requested information may relate to firm demographics as well
as the number of hours and dollars billed by attorneys working on
GE matters. Information is collected and analyzed in an effort to
ensure that a diverse mix of attorneys is leveraged for GE
matters.
But if there is any lingering doubt about how realistic Mr. Munnie's
hypothetical choice between Will and Bob really is, perhaps we should
assume that the client submitting the Request for Proposal is Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart's demands on its law firms are quite public and very detailed. In
an article posted on www.law.com, Meredith Hobbs reported that Wal-
Mart's general counsel, Thomas Mars, had told the retailer's "top 100 law
firms that at least one person of color and one woman must be among the
top five relationship attorneys that handle [Wal-Mart's] business." 9 Mars
outlined the policy in a memorandum, stating that each of the firms would
submit a slate of three to five attorneys who would be the existing
relationship attorneys on the Wal-Mart account. Wal-Mart would then
review the slates and perhaps choose a new existing relationship attorney to
handle the account.'1 Thus, if the top existing relationship attorney were a
white male, Wal-Mart wanted to be in a position to choose a person of
color or a woman to replace him from the proffered slate, based solely on
race or gender. It is clear that Wal-Mart is dedicated to following through
with its new policy regarding firms: "[W]e have ended our relationship
with two law firms for failing to meet our diversity expectations." 1
7. Pfizer Litigation Group, Request for Interest, at 12 (Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with
author).
8. General Electric Outside Counsel Policy, at 4 (Jan. 2004).
9. Meredith Hobbs, Wal-Mart Demands Diversity in Law Firms, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORT, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 1120579809481
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
10. Wal-Mart Requires Diversity in its Law Firms,
http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/1845.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
11. Id.
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In such an environment, it is not difficult to understand Mr.
Munnie's point of view. He may not care what color his colleagues are,
but his clients evidently do. The demands of clients on law firms are
widely acknowledged as simply another issue that firms need to take into
account while conducting business. In a recent New York Times article,
"Why Do So Few Women Reach the Top of Big Law Firms?," Timothy L.
O'Brien takes it as a given that firms hire and retain lawyers in order to
meet their clients' demands: "With law firms courting major corporations
that demand diversity within the ranks of those advising them.... veteran
lawyers say that promoting women's legal careers is not just a matter of
goodwill or high-mindedness. It's also a winning business strategy."' 2 The
same has been said for hiring minority lawyers: "Thanks to vigorous
recruiting and pressure from corporate clients, black lawyers are well
represented now among new associates at the nation's most prestigious law
firms." ' 3 Michael M. Boone, a founding partner of Haynes and Boone in
Dallas, agrees: "Even the largest firms are at risk if they don't [hire in
accordance with good business sense]. 14 If the clients want women or
minorities-or even Martians, as Boone jokes in the interview-then those
groups are where law firms should turn for recruitment.
Whether companies have simply adopted the Call to Action of the
ACC or have developed their own company-specific statements, it seems
clear that Wal-Mart, Sara Lee and the rest are demanding diversity from
their outside counsel. Law firms have the choice of meeting that demand
or losing that business. It should be emphasized, moreover, that these
diversity demands are generally being made in good faith and with good
intentions. Absent a push from its clients, it may be that a given law firm
will adopt or continue practices that have the effect of preventing minority
or female attorneys from achieving full potential. What is widely known as
the "glass ceiling" has formed, limiting certain employees to rise to a
certain level within an organization due to race, gender or other
characteristics, and then to remain permanently without any hope of
advancement. Scholars have written extensively on the persistence of this
problem. "5
12. Timothy L. O'Brien, Why Do So Few Women Reach the Top of Big Law Firms?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 3, at 4.
13. Adam Liptak, Lawyers Debate Why Blacks Lag at Major Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2006, at Al.
14. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 4.
15. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII
Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1517 (1994-
1995) (arguing that Title VII does not provide a successful framework for breaking down
the glass ceiling because it principally addresses employment decisions and the glass ceiling
occurs where advancement decisions instead of employment decisions are made); Elizabeth
K. Ziewacz, Can the Glass Ceiling Be Shattered?: The Decline of Women Partners in
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That having been said, can we reasonably expect that the good
intentions behind the Call to Action will matter to Will White? For all
practical purposes, Mr. Munnie has told him he will not make partner
because the client prefers dealing with a lawyer of a different race. Mr.
Munnie wants Will to understand that this racial choice is no fault of the
firm; the firm, he says, does not hire or promote on racial grounds. But the
firm does what it needs to do to meet its clients' desires, and it seems that
the clients do indeed pick their lawyers on racial grounds. So the fault - if
there is one - is the client's, not the firm's.
Yet Will seems to remember that this defense to a race discrimination
claim has been tried before. Back when he and Bob were studying
Employment Discrimination in law school, they discussed this very subject
(or one related). And, if Will's memory serves, the defense in question was
not successful. Indeed, one of the oddest aspects of our hypothetical is that
those who are authoring and implementing the Call to Action are not just
businessmen-they are the chief legal officers of their companies. Those
who are responding to the Call to Action are lawyers in the best law firms
in the United States. One would think that someone--on either end of the
transaction-would realize that accommodating clients' racial preferences
might be illegal. It can be assumed that all lawyers involved either are
uncertain of the illegality of this practice, or in the alternative, are certain
that it is legal. It is necessary to turn to Title VII and the case law to
determine whether these lawyers are right.
II. THE HISTORY OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addresses employment
discrimination. From the start, Congress recognized that businesses would
seek to use bona fide business reasons to explain their employment
practices. To this end, section 703(e) of Title VII allows for certain
characteristics of employees to be taken into account in employment
Large Law Firms, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 971 (1996) (analyzing the under-population of female
partners in firms, and suggesting that a change in attitudes, flexibility for women with
family responsibilities, and a better use of mentors would make a crack in the glass ceiling);
M. Neil Browne and Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Many Paths to Justice: The Glass Ceiling,
the Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the Other Side, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 61 (2003-2004) (considering the general context of confrontations with the glass
ceiling, with a particular emphasis on "lookism" - the practice of using physical appearance
as a gauge for an employee's potential advancement); David A. Cotter et. al., The Glass
Ceiling Effect, 80 Soc. F. 655 (2001-2002) (defining four specific criteria for determining
where a glass ceiling exists and concluding that the term should only be applied to gender
and not to racial inequalities); Mark S. Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory
for Attacking Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17 (1994-1995)
(arguing that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that governs all
partnership agreements, prohibiting gender discrimination between partners).
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decisions:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [title] ... it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of [] religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise. 
6
Thus, the presence of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) in an
employment situation is a statutory defense to intentional discrimination. It
is significant, however, that in listing "religion, sex, or national origin,"''
section 703(e) omits race and color as excusable bona fide occupational
qualifications.
The legislative history behind Title VII sheds some light on the
omission of race and color in the BFOQ exceptions, and, not surprisingly, it
demonstrates that the omission was deliberate. Indeed, Representative
John Williams (D-MS) had proposed an amendment that would have
included race and color and his reasoning had much to do with client
preferences. For example, he worried that traditionally black businesses
would be forced to hire white employees, which would "destroy [those
businesses'] identit[ies] as [] Negro business[es], the very quality
responsible for [their] success[es]."' 8 Other representatives agreed. While
discussing the issue of blacks hiring only other blacks, Representative
Rivers said, ".... we do not want to change this. We are getting along fine.
We do not want to change."
19
Nevertheless, the Williams amendment was voted down.2 ° Many
Representatives opposed the amendment because it went directly against
the purpose of the Civil Rights Act-Congress did not want black
businesses hiring only blacks and white businesses hiring only whites. It
was exactly this problem that Congress was attempting to eradicate.2
Representative Celler (D-NY) stated that, "We did not include the word
'race' because we felt that race would not be a bona fide qualification."22
Celler continued, "[T]he basic purpose of [T]itle VII is to prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color. Now the
substitute amendment . . .would destroy this principle. It would permit
discrimination on the basis of race or color. It would establish a loophole,
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
17. Id.
18. 110 Cong. Rec. 2550 (1964).
19. Id. at 2552.
20. Id. at 2563 (voting down the amendment with 78 for and 108 against).
21. Id. at 2559.
22. Id. at 2550.
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that could well gut this [T]itle. 23  Representative O'Hara stated, "[the
substitute amendment] opens up other possibilities that I do not think any
of us would want to open. 24 Representative Alger said, "when we write
laws they must apply equally to all people. We must not, in our zeal to
protect civil rights, inflict civil wrongs on anyone in the name of protecting
civil rights. 25 In discussing the dissension over a lack of race as a BFOQ,
Representative Corman simply stated, "My answer, sir, is that they will just
have to live with it."
2 6
In fact, in its discussion of the amendment for race as a BFOQ,
Congress discussed a hypothetical situation very similar to that presented
above. The hypothetical proposed was that if all candidates for a position
are equal, how can an employer make his choice about whom to hire or
promote? In response, Representative Goodell stated, "If a person refuses
to hire for any reason other than race, creed, or color that would be all
right." 27 Thus, an employer cannot legally refuse to hire (or choose to hire)
for the reason of race, creed or color-exactly what Mr. Munnie is doing
here.
Therefore, it cannot be argued that Congress's omission of a race or
color exception from section 703(e) was an oversight. The subject was
discussed at length. Congress knew what it was doing. Any inclusion of
race or color in the BFOQ exceptions, it was feared, would "destroy [the]
principle" of Title VII.
28
III. BFOQ CASE LAW AND CLIENT PREFERENCES
After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, it was ultimately up to the
courts to determine how expansive Title VII should be. In court, a bona-
fide occupational qualification provides a statutory defense for employers
who are intentionally using discriminatory practices in the workplace.
While an employer is usually prohibited from discriminating against
employees with respect to religion, sex, or national origin, an employer is
permitted to take those factors into account if any are deemed "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise., 29 It was left to the courts to determine what makes a practice
reasonably necessary.
In its first significant case of this kind, the Supreme Court employed a
23. Id. at 2556.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2557.
26. Id. at 2559.
27. Id. at 2560 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 2556.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
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very narrow definition of the BFOQ defense. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,0
the Court stated that a BFOQ is "an extremely narrow exception to the
general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex."'I
The Court would allow gender-based discrimination only if the
employer's ability to accomplish the essential aspects of business would be
compromised if the employer could not discriminate against one gender or
the other.32 In this case, the Court upheld a rule requiring prison guards in
"contact" positions to be the same gender as the inmates they guarded,
reasoning that an "employee's very womanhood" could undermine her
ability to do her job.33 Soon after, the Supreme Court was confronted by the
BFOQ defense in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case. In
Western Air Lines v. Criswell,4 a group of flight engineers brought an age
discrimination case against Western Air Lines. The airline had either
forced them to retire when they reached the age of sixty years old or
refused to reassign the engineers once they reached that age, because they
were part of the company's retirement plan.35 The Supreme Court held for
the engineers, noting that instructing the jury "to defer to 'Western's
selection of job qualifications ... that are reasonable in light of the safety
risks' . . . is plainly at odds with Congress' decision . . . to subject such
management decisions to a test of objective justification .... The Court
stated that "[t]he BFOQ standard adopted in [the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967] is one of 'reasonable necessity,' not
reasonableness. 37 Simply because it was feasible that old engineers were
not as quick at work as their younger counterparts did not mean that the
jury was prohibited from questioning that reasoning and the evidence
presented by the airline. Thus, simply because an employer deems a
discriminatory characteristic as "reasonably necessary" to his or her
business does not mean that this conclusion will go unquestioned. Even
when invoking an explicit BFOQ exception, an employer is still required to
show justification.
Most BFOQ cases in the Courts of Appeals reflect the narrowness of
this exception. There are cases, however, in which the preferences of the
employer's clients or customers have been considered. " In those cases, it
30. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id. at 336.
33. Id.
34. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
35. Id. at 402-405.
36. Id. at 419.
37. Id.
38. See Steven F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 22 (1991) (discussing cases that have
succeeded in establishing a bona-fide occupational qualification).
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is the exact preferences of the employer's clients that make an employee
characteristic "essential" to the business. In Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed a girls club
to discriminate against unmarried pregnant women, because that class of
women would not serve as good role models for the girls.3 9 Similarly, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Wisconsin
Department of Health and Social Services could discriminate and hire only
female employees to work in a women's maximum security prison due to
the rehabilitation needs of women prisoners.40
Because these cases are highly unusual, it is hard to see how they
could be used to justify employment decisions based on a customer's
preference for dealing with an employee of a particular sex or race where
the services provided (e.g., legal or accounting services) have no specific
racial or sexual aspects. Certainly the need for role models for young girls
or the need for same-sex rehabilitation is a long way from a law firm's
desire to please its client by offering an African-American (or female)
"relationship attorney." Minority or female associates and partners cannot
be said to help the firm's clients in a better or worse way because of their
gender or the color of their skin.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has stated
that the BFOQ exception should be interpreted very narrowly.4' It lists a
number of situations that do not warrant the use of the BFOQ exceptions
including "[tjhe refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of
coworkers, the employer, clients or customers .... ,2 The only exception
the EEOC makes in this instance is for a situation concerning authenticity,
such as the hiring of an actor or actress. 43 In the Notes that accompany this
section of the EEOC guidelines, the Commission reiterates that the
exception protects an employer's gender preferences only if they are based
on the employer's inability to perform a service that it offers. 44 The EEOC
uses the case Bollenbach v. Board of Educuation of Monroe-Woodbury
Central School Dist. ,4 to illustrate its point. In that case, even though a
religious group preferred male bus drivers to drive male school children to
a religious school, this customer preference "did not make being male a
'bona-fide occupational qualification"' of being a bus driver.4 6 The EEOC
further states, "Economic considerations cannot be the basis for a [BFOQ]
39. 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
40. BEFORT, supra note 36 at 23, citing Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social
Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1998).
42. Id. at §1604.2(a)(iii).
43. Id.
44. Notes to 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2.
45. 659 F.Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
46. Notes to 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2.
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defense to a discriminatory hiring case under Title VII., 47
This view has been echoed in the Courts of Appeals. In the early
1970s, Pan American Airways had a policy of hiring only female flight
attendants. The airline's reasoning for this policy was that "[t]he
performance of female attendants was better in the sense that they were
superior in such non-mechanical aspects of the job as 'providing
reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service
and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible within the
limitations imposed by aircraft operations."' '4 Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the airline could not require that its
flight attendants be female. While the airline might benefit to some degree
because its passengers prefer female flight attendants, this potential benefit
was "tangential to the essence of the business involved. ''A9 Even if women
may be more "desirable" in a given occupation to a degree that makes the
business employing them more competitive or profitable, it does not follow
that their gender is an occupational qualification. Congress's purpose in
passing the Civil Rights Act was not to enable businesses to become more
profitable, but "to provide a foundation in the law for the principle of
nondiscrimination. ' 5°
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was confronted by
a similar issue. Wynn Oil Company chose not to promote Delia Fernandez,
a woman, to the position of Vice-President of the International Operations
division.5 Wynn Oil reasoned that Latin American clients would react
negatively to a woman in such a high position, and thus take their business
elsewhere. The company argued that placing a woman in such a position
would "destroy the essence" of its business.52 In its decision, the Court of
Appeals held that Wynn Oil's reasoning was inadequate as a matter of law
because customer preference cannot justify gender discrimination:
"stereotypic impressions of male and female roles do not qualify gender as
a BFOQ .... Nor does stereotyped customer preference justify a sexually
discriminatory practice."53  The Court went on to cite the EEOC's
regulations, which state that the only customer preferences that can be
taken into consideration are those concerning authenticity.54
Even when client preferences are cloaked in more widely accepted
reasons for allowing BFOQ exemptions, they seldom prevail. In Miller v.
47. Id. at note 21.
48. Diaz v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. Id. at 388.
50. Id. at 386, citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
51. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. Id. at 1276.
53. Id. at 1276-77.
54. Id. at 1277, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1972).
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Texas State Board of Barber Examiners, James Miller, a black man,
charged the Texas State Board of Barber Examiners with discriminating on
the basis of race through its assigning process.55 While the white inspectors
were assigned by geographical area, Miller was assigned to inspect the
black and Mexican-American barber shops throughout the region because
"the white inspectors refused to inspect black barber shops because of fears
of physical violence. 56 While this seems to be an issue of safety, perhaps
it could also be seen another way: black and Mexican-American
shopkeepers threatened violence, because they did not want white
inspectors in their shops-they only wanted inspectors of the same race.
Whatever the reasoning of the State Board was, the Court refused to apply
any BFOQ for race, stating that race was "conspicuously absent from the
[Title VII] exception; therefore . . . there is no exception for either
intentional or unintentional racial discrimination.,
57
One year later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in the
same way. In Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service Commission,58 James
Knight alleged that the Commission had violated Title VII by failing to
promote him and transferring him from the Commission's Test
Development Division to the Recruitment Division for the purpose of
recruiting minority applicants.5 9 The Court held that Knight's assignment
to handle minority recruitment was impermissible because there was no
BFOQ exception for race, and the Commission's reasoning "was based on
a racial stereotype that blacks work better with blacks and on the premise
that Knight's race was directly related to his ability to do the job., 6' The
Court of Appeals added that "[n]o matter how laudable the Commission's
intention might be[] in trying to attract more minority applicants to the
Civil Service[,] the fact remains that Knight was assigned a particular job
(against his wishes) because his race was believed to specially qualify him
for the work.",
6'
Other cases, although they do not address client preferences directly,
may speak to the situation at Makeus Lotsuf Munnie, LLP. In Swint v.
Pullman-Standard,62 Pullman-Standard had certain jobs that were
unofficially "white only" jobs, and others that were unofficially "black
only" jobs.63 This racial imbalance was perpetuated by a seniority system
in place at the company, which made transferring departments very
55. 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 651.
57. Id. at 652.
58. 649 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id. at 162.
61. Id.
62. 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 527.
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difficult for minorities. 64 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated
that the BFOQ exception under Title VII is inapplicable to racial
discrimination, reviewing the legislative history of Title VII and noting that
"Congress did not view race as a qualification which could, conceptually,
be reasonably necessary to the efficient operation of any business.
6
Similarly, in Smallwood v. United Airlines Inc. ,66 United Airlines tried
to justify its rule against hiring pilots older than thirty-five years old. At
trial, the airline reasoned that training was expensive and that hiring young
pilots allowed the company to cut down on costs because younger pilots
had a longer period of peak productivity.67 In first answering Smallwood's
claim, United argued a form of the business necessity defense, claiming "a
maximum age of 35 at hire was necessary to achieve peak productivity."68
It was only later in an amended answer that United raised the BFOQ
defense. In any event, the Court found that United did not satisfy the
BFOQ standard. Applying a two-prong test for claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Court of Appeals rejected United
Airlines' explanation, holding that just because a certain practice is more
profitable, it does not follow that it is essential. The Court defined
economic considerations as "precisely those considerations [that] were
among the targets of the [ADEA]." 69 Any disabilities or handicaps related
to work performance that are a result of aging can be discovered on an
individual basis, showing that no age discrimination BFOQ defense is
required.7 °
Consistent with the law established by the Courts of Appeals, the
Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling in 1991, embraced a strict rule in the
field of disparate impact cases and disparate treatment analysis. In
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,7 1 Johnson Controls
had a policy prohibiting fertile women from manufacturing batteries. The
company reasoned that batteries contained high amounts of lead, which
created potential health risks for employees and any fetus carried by an
employee.72 One of the reasons this case is so significant is that it discusses
the defendant's potential use of a business necessity defense as well as the
BFOQ defense. In granting Johnson Controls' request for summary
judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had held that the
proper standard for evaluating Johnson Controls was the business necessity
64. Id
65. Id. at 535.
66. 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 306.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 307.
70. Id. at 308-309.
71. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
72. Id. at 190.
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defense, but that the defendant would still receive summary judgment if it
were subjected to the BFOQ standard. 7' The Supreme Court held that this
reasoning was incorrect. The Court had established the business necessity
defense in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,74 stating: "The Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited., 75 An employer
can only use a business necessity defense when his or her motive for some
sort of exclusion is arguably benign. Here, Johnson Controls' motive to
exclude fertile women was not benign and it did not get the benefit of the
defense.
The Court also held that Johnson Controls could not establish a BFOQ
defense.76 Johnson Controls argued that its policy fell within the safety
exception of the BFOQ defense. 7' But even if the company's concerns for
the health of its female employees and their future children may be
laudable, it is simply not the company's place to make such decisions.
Women (including fertile women) are just as able to manufacture batteries
as efficiently as their male counterparts, and the company could not
discriminate against them simply because the women could get pregnant.78
Thus, Johnson Controls reaffirms the standard that business necessity can
only be invoked in disparate impact cases. When an employer
discriminates on the basis of gender, national origin, or religion, the courts
must turn to a disparate treatment analysis, and the only statutory defense
the employer may invoke is the BFOQ defense.
What is happening at Makeus Lotsuf Munnie LLP is analogous to the
BFOQ cases concerning client preferences, and, using the reasoning of the
Courts cited above, the law would appear to be that law firms cannot bend
under the pressure of the Call to Action, however well-intentioned that
pressure may be. It is true, of course, that the firm is only trying to satisfy
its clients. Moreover, its clients are not motivated by some kind of racial
animus. To the contrary, they are only trying to further the cause of
diversity in law firms. Yet many of the clients in the BFOQ cases did not
think they were being motivated by animus either: many airplane
passengers actually thought that female stewardesses were better for
airplane morale because of their gender. Similarly, many South American
clients (and perhaps clients all over the world) actually believe that men,
73. Id. at 187.
74. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
75. Id. at431.
76. 499 U.S. at 206.
77. Id. at 202.
78. Id. at 206-207.
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not women, should be expected to handle important business affairs. But
on a policy level, Congress and the Courts have decided that client
preferences and economic concerns are not going to be taken into account.
The law, in other words, is just as Will White remembers it.
It could be argued, of course, that the BFOQ exception has become
too narrow and that the law needs changing. Some scholars have said
exactly that, suggesting that it would make sense to include an explicit
BFOQ exception for race under Title VII. In his Note, "Justifiable
Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination," William R. Bryant argues
that there are simply too many situations in which a race exception is
justified. For instance, "[w]hile an employer should be allowed to
discriminate against non-African Americans when casting for the role of
Martin Luther King, Jr., such discrimination is illegal under the strict
language of Title VII[.] ' 79 Bryant reasons that the Courts have so narrowly
construed the other exceptions that race could be included under Title VII
because it would be just as narrowly construed.8° He goes on to suggest
that Title VII be amended to include a race exemption when: (1) the
essence of the business in question would be undermined by prohibiting the
discrimination; (2) all or substantially all of the people who are not part of
the class in question are unable to perform the essence of the job; and (3)
no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative exists.8 Bryant provides a
few central circumstances in which all three prongs of this theory would be
met.8"
Whether or not race should be included in the BFOQ exception under
Title VII, it seems that even Bryant's proposal would not allow law firms
to hire (or fire) lawyers based on their clients' demands. The law firms in
this instance would fail the business essence test - prohibiting the use of a
racial BFOQ would in no way alter the essence of the business of a law
firm. The quality and success of the law firm's work does not depend on
the race of its associates.
79. William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REv. 211, 213
(1998-1999).
80. Id. at 220.
81. Id. at 241,
82. Bryant suggests implementing a racial BFOQ for the authenticity problem (such as
the Martin Luther King, Jr. example), for inmate populations (such as a prison hiring
security guards based on race to reflect the racial makeup of the inmate population), and for
other policing needs (such as officers reflecting the racial makeup of their community). Id.
at 228-236.
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IV. IS A CLIENT DEMAND FOR A MINORITY LAWYER A FORM OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?
So how will Mr. Munnie and his firm defend against Will White's
charge of race discrimination (assuming Will is prepared to destroy his
career with the firm by bringing such a charge)? The law that was meant to
apply to the kind of decision Mr. Munnie made - the BFOQ defense -
evidently offers the firm no help. It is no doubt true that Makeus Lotsuf
Munnie LLP is merely trying to comply with its customer's wishes. But
the law is that this particular excuse does not work. Race discrimination is
illegal-even if it makes undeniable business sense.
Presumably, Rick Palmore and his colleagues know that. So does Mr.
Munnie. Yet they persist. Why? The only plausible explanation is that
they believe that they are engaged in a form of affirmative action that is
exempt from the straight-forward reading of Title VII. Given the array of
legal talent that has signed on to the Call for Action, one might assume that
the "affirmative action" cases provide a solid legal basis for acceding to the
demands clients are now making. But there are reasons to question this
assumption.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber,83 United Steelworkers and Kaiser
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a
voluntary affirmative action plan designed to eliminate racial imbalance in
Kaiser's workforce.14  The new training program reserved 50% of the
available spots for black applicants. Weber, a white production worker
with seniority over blacks that had received spots in the training program,
was rejected and brought a class action suit under Title VII, sections 701(a)
and 701(d).85 Relying on a somewhat questionable case,16 Justice Brennan
wrote for the majority that whatever the actual language of Title VII may
have been, the "spirit" of the law was to correct racial imbalances in the
workplace. 87 It would be ironic, he reasoned, if the law were used to
frustrate that intention.88
Justice Brennan's opinion has been criticized, however. As Richard
A. Epstein wrote, "As a matter of statutory construction his opinion rests
83. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
84. Id. at 197 (describing the affirmative action plan that aimed to employ a percentage
of black employees commensurate with the local labor force).
85. Id. at 199-200.
86. Justice Brennan relies on Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892), in which Justice Brewer relied more on his Christianity than the written law and
rationalized a part of his decision based on the fact that the United States is a "Christian
nation." Id. at 471.
87. 443 U.S. at 201.
88. Id. at 202.
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largely on quicksand."89 The same point was made by Justice Rehnquist in
his dissent, which argued that Title VII does not permit affirmative action;
its purpose is the end of discrimination, not to promulgate reverse
discrimination.9" Justice Rehnquist's view also finds support in the
legislative history. The legislators that passed Title VII in 1964 did not
intend for it to encompass affirmative action. Indeed, as Senators Case and
Clark wrote in a memorandum concerning the legislation:
There is no requirement in [T]itle VII that an employer maintain
a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any
deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a
balance may be, would involve a violation of [T]itle VII because
maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or
to refuse to hire on the basis of race.9'
Nevertheless, Weber certainly provides support for the proposition
that a voluntary affirmative action plan can provide a defense for a racial
discrimination that would otherwise be subject to attack under Title VII.
In reviewing Section 7030)92 of Title VII, the Supreme Court found
significance in the fact that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be
interpreted to require any employer 93 to give preferential treatment. The
language Congress used did not prohibit an interpretation of Title VII that
89. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 399 (1992).
90. 443 U.S. at 254-255 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
interpretation of the "spirit" of the law is incompatible with the 88 th Congress's intention
that equality is the "spirit" of the law). Justice Scalia later argued that congressional
inaction after the Weber decision did not necessarily signal Congress's approval of the
Court's reasoning and the case should not be treated as precedent under stare decisis,
because that case itself broke with precedent; the Court misapprehended the meaning of the
statute and the case should be overruled. Johnson v. California Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara, Cal, 480 U.S. 616, 672-673 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. EPSTEIN, supra note 87, at 398 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964)).
92. Section 7030) of Title VII reads,
"Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any
employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by
any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
other area." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
93. 443 U.S. at 205-206 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)).
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would permit (as opposed to require) voluntary affirmative action efforts.94
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Section 7030) did not prohibit an
employer from hiring based on race, and that the "natural inference [was]
that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative
action. 95 The Court found that the agreement in United Steelworkers' and
Kaiser's plan was "within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the
private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to
eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories., 96 The Supreme Court limited its endorsement of affirmative
action plans to those seeking to correct a "manifest racial imbalance. '
The continuing vitality of Weber can be seen in Petit v. City of
Chicago, where a group of white police officers had brought a Section
1983 Equal Protection Clause suit against the City for discriminating in its
sergeant promotional process. The Court found for the City, holding that
the police force has a compelling interest in achieving racial diversity and
announced a willingness to defer to experts in the field: "it is proper in this
case to rely on the views of experts and Chicago police executives that
affirmative action was warranted to enhance the operations of the CPD." 99
Although the Court acknowledged that white police officers were being
discriminated against during this process, it provided them with little
consolation and no remedy: "[w]hile we do not minimize the loss that
those who were not promoted suffered, we find that the procedures met the
Grutter standard for minimizing harm to members of any racial group."'
100
As for the "Grutter standard" to which the Petit Court referred, that
might be of particular use to Mr. Munnie and his firm because it comes
from Grutter v. Bollinger,'0 ' an affirmative action case involving law
school admissions. In that case, the University of Michigan acknowledged
that it was using race as a factor in its law school admissions. This
discrimination, it said, was necessary to secure a sufficiently "diverse" law
school class and, by extension, a sufficiently diverse bar. The Supreme
Court, by the narrowest of majorities, allowed the discrimination to stand -
but only for another twenty-five years. Discrimination of this kind
evidently becomes illegal, with or without an Act of Congress or a
constitutional amendment, in 2028.102
94. Id. at 206.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 209.
97. Id. at 208.
98. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
99. Id. at 1114.
100. Id. at lll7.
101. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
102. Id. at 343. In coming to this conclusion, the Court reflected an obvious reluctance
to endorse affirmative action on principle. As Epstein observes, "[t]here is no question but
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That will be more than enough time, of course, for Mr. Munnie to
make his clients happy and for Will White to find another line of work.
But even if Weber and Grutter provide a rationale and defense for some
affirmative action plans, do they really help Makeus Lotsuf Munnie LLP?
The answer is that they only help if the firm is willing to do and say some
things that it has not done or said in the hypothetical set forth above. For
instance, those cases would help if the firm were to adopt its own
"voluntary" affirmative action plan in order to redress an imbalance in its
own workforce.' °3 But that is not what the firm has done here. Nor has the
firm so much as suggested that it is favoring Bob Black over Will White to
"remedy" any kind of discrimination-societal or otherwise. The firm is
already diverse. It is not acting to address a perceived problem. Its defense
is that it is responding to the stated racial preferences of its client. Perhaps
such candor about its motives would be unusual in the real world, and the
firm would be more than willing to pretend that it was engaging in
affirmative action even when it was not. But if Title VII truly prohibits an
employer from using race in its employment decisions in order to meet
customer preferences, why shouldn't it protect Will White? And if we
conclude that it should not protect Will White, shouldn't we change the law
instead of asking employers to pretend they are doing something that they
are not?
The fact is that Mr. Munnie is not attempting to eliminate
"conspicuous racial imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category."
He is, instead, trying to meet a client's request. And nothing in Weber-or
any other case-suggests that the client may impose its own "voluntary"
affirmative action plan on another business. Whether or not Wal-Mart may
discriminate against its own employees on racial grounds, its demand that
its lawyers discriminate against their employees on racial grounds is surely
that affirmative action remedial decisions have resulted in an erosion of the color-blind and
race-blind standards." EPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 410. The principle of color-blind and
race-blind standards remains attractive to the Court, even if it is not always followed.
103. Certainly, large law firms should be afforded the same opportunities available to
other businesses to address problems in their own workforces. Different firms at different
times can find that they are having difficulty attracting or retaining minority lawyers.
"Between 1989 and 1996, Cleary Gottlieb hired more than 30 African American associates.
Today, none remain." Alan Jenkins, Losing the Race, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 92 (Oct.
2001). The situation at that firm changed radically over time: "After a 50-year history as a
virtually all-white institution, Cleary was becoming something of a mecca for young black
lawyers. The firm went from only one black associate in early 1989 to 23 in 1992. By 1996
it had 30, giving it one of the highest numbers of black attorneys in the country. Over the
same period, it increased its number of Latino attorneys from six to 14 and its number of
Asian and Asian-American attorneys from seven to 24." Id. By 2001, however, Cleary had
encountered difficulties in retaining these lawyers. If the firm had adopted a plan to address
that problem, it would be in a better position to rely on the "affirmative action cases" than
the firm in our hypothetical, which, by hypothesis, has no such problem and no such plan.
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new and different. If its lawyers do so, it is hard to see why the BFOQ
cases-which present exactly this issue-are not the more relevant
authority.
As for Grutter, the law school's use of racial preferences was deemed
acceptable in part because a quota-system was not used. But when law
firms meet their clients' demands of placing at least a certain number of
minority or female associates on each account, a type of silent quota will
gradually appear. Indeed, the quota is not even all that silent. Wal-Mart
says that it needs at least one minority and one female out of a list of five.
That is a fairly explicit quota. Those affirmative action plans that have
been approved by the Courts-whether adopted by the University of
Michigan, the United Steelworkers or the Chicago Police Department -
have always involved large enough numbers that their sponsors can at least
pretend that the policy is intended to address a balance of a given
workplace or environment. A law firm's selection of a relatively small
number of lawyers to work with a particular client is different in kind. The
firm is not even arguably acting to remedy the effects of societal
discrimination (or its own past discrimination) in its own workplace. It is
merely meeting the client's expressed preferences regarding race and/or
gender, and it is doing so, inevitably, on a case by case basis.
In his article "Voluntary Affirmative Action in Employment for
Women and Minorities Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Extending
Possibilities for Employers to Engage in Preferential Treatment to Achieve
Equal Employment Opportunity," Chris Engels reviews the concept and
current law of voluntary affirmative action plans. His concept of voluntary
plans "includes all plans instituted without any legal requirement imposed
upon the private employer to engage in any kind of preferential
treatment."' ° 4 Engels proposes that "the employer should be granted much
more leeway in determining whether it is justified in instituting an
affirmative action plan,"'15 and lays out a two-part test for Courts to use.
First, he says, the courts should ask "whether the employer's work force
was manifestly imbalanced as compared to the composition of the general
area labor market."' 0 6 If the answer is in the affirmative, courts should then
"determine whether sufficient room is left for the advancement and
participation of the non-beneficiaries of the plan."' 7
104. Chris Engels, Voluntary Affirmative Action in Employment for Women and
Minorities Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Extending Possibilities for Employers to
Engage in Preferential Treatment to Achieve Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 731, 734 (1991).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 813.
107. Id.
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Engels' proposal has yet to be adopted by the courts. But even if it
were, it would not help Makeus Lotsuf Munnie LLP. The firm's workforce
was not manifestly imbalanced as compared to its peers. And-even if it
had been - the firm's response to a single RFP does nothing to address that
imbalance. Finally, once the firm responds as it has, there is, by definition,
no room for Will's advancement. Engels' proposal-and affirmative
action, generally-is an interesting and controversial subject. A firm's
assignment of a specific lawyer to a specific account because of his race (or
her gender), however, simply is not an "affirmative action" decision, and
there is no good reason to pretend that it is.
V. CONCLUSION
This is not to say that law firms should not strive to employ more
minority and female lawyers. There is an undeniable dearth of both groups
at law firms. In Women in American Law: The Struggle Toward Equality
from the New Deal to the Present, Judith A. Baer wrote of the obstacles
women face not only in law school, but in law firms, in court, and from
other lawyers generally.108  For every additional hurdle, there are fewer
lawyers who will attempt to climb it. According to the National
Association for Law Placement (NALP), only about seventeen percent of
partners at major law firms last year were women and only about four
percent of partners were minorities.'0 9 The absence of more women and
more minorities in the top positions at law firms is troubling and should be
addressed. ° Law firms may want to change their internal policies that
discourage so many young women and minority associates from staying at
the firms for the duration of their careers. Exploring courses of action such
as instituting a better mentor system for young associates, providing on-site
day care facilities and allowing employees to be flexible and work from
home part-time would certainly encourage at least some young lawyers to
stay on with a firm and advance into its upper ranks.
108. JUDITH A. BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD EQUALITY
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT 284-93 (2002).
109. Roy S. Ginsburg, Diversity Makes Cents: The Business Case for Diversity,
http://www.royginsburg.com/clearticle_2.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
110. In his recent study of minority recruitment and advancement at large law firms in
the United States, Professor Richard H. Sander concludes that law firms hire minority
associates with lower grades than their white peers to ensure diversity. According to
Professor Sander, because these white associates had higher grades than their minority
counterparts during law school, this inevitably results in minority lawyers' failure to
advance because they are competing with peers who are simply more qualified. Richard H.
Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1769 (2005-06).
While this study has been met with some criticism, many hope that Professor Sander's
findings and data will open up the discussion to the problem of minority advancement at law
firms nationwide. See Liptak, supra note 13.
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It is a considerable leap, however, to seek to address this problem by
permitting firms to rely on an explicit demand from their clients that they
assign minority and female lawyers to the clients' accounts. The clients'
motives may be good. The law firms' response is undoubtedly entirely
driven by economic advantage and not by prejudice. But this very question
was addressed in 1964 and in the BFOQ cases. The decision then was that
a legitimate economic justification for racial discrimination was not a good
defense against an employee victimized by that discrimination. If that
judgment is going to change, then it is up to Congress-not the Association
of Corporate Counsel-to change it.
